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Commentaries
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A
Proposal for Reformt
by MARY SIEGEL*
In recent years, corporate management has captured the attention of
the public, scholars, journalists, courts, and Congress by employing a
variety of creative and effective tactics to defend its corporation from a
tender offer. Once content to use tactics that merely deterred or de-
flected hostile tender offers, target management has now escalated the
war against such offers by devising defensive tactics that have been color-
fully described as the "Jonestown Defense,"' "Pac-Man offers,"'2 "crown
jewel options,"'3 and "golden parachute agreements."'4
t © Copyright 1985 Mary Siegel.
* Professor of Law, The American University, Washington College of Law. A.B.,
1972, Vassar College; J.D., 1975, Yale University. The research for this Commentary was
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son, J.D., 1985, The American University, Washington College of Law, and the editorial
assistance of Louis J. Trotter, Jr. The author also acknowledges the assistance of Nancy
Gauger, Melissa Rhea, and Jean Tennaka.
1. H. LAMPERT, TILL DEATH Do Us PART 65 (1983) (quoting Jay Higgins, an invest-
ment banker with Solomon Brothers, who worked for Bendix Corporation during the 1983
Bendix-Martin Marietta takeover battle).
2. In the "Pac-Man" defensive tactic, the target company counters an unwanted tender
offer by making its own tender offer for the stock of the would-be acquiror. By making a
counter offer, the target company implicitly acknowledges the desirability of a combination
between itself and the bidder. The counter offer changes the terms of that combination, partic-
ularly determining which corporation will be dominant. The target necessarily waives certain
defenses such as antitrust and regulatory claims, but may continue to contest the ultimate
management control, terms, and capital structure of the first proposed business combination.
There are two common business justifications for employing the Pac-Man defense. First,
the board may conclude that the company should not only remain independent to develop its
own businesses, but also acquire the raider because acquisition presents a desirable business
opportunity. The second justification commonly advanced is that the company should be sold
only at a higher price or on different terms.
3. The "crown-jewel option" involves the grant of an option to purchase a key asset of
the target company, commonly referred to as its "crown jewel." The crown jewel option is
particularly useful when this asset is the hostile bidder's primary motive for commencing the
Behind the drama lie several fundamental issues of corporate law.
Target management, when confronted with a hostile tender offer,5 faces a
potential conflict of interest concerning whether it can fight the offer and
simultaneously satisfy its fiduciary duty of loyalty. Although most
courts have found that management can achieve both,6 many scholars7
and some judges8 vehemently disagree. If satisfaction of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty and impartial evaluation of the merits of a tender offer are
mutually exclusive accomplishments for target management, then legisla-
tures must address whether and how to regulate tender offers in an envi-
ronment that increasingly presents this dilemma. Despite a variety of
proposals by courts and scholars, none has successfully balanced the
takeover. Thus, by granting this option to someone else, the target immediately makes itself
unattractive to the hostile bidder. See also infra notes 27, 29 & accompanying text.
4. "Golden parachutes" are special employment contracts that protect key executives
should control of their company change hands. These contracts frequently provide manage-
ment with long tenure, as Well as the right to large severance benefits and acceleration of
benefits. These contracts thus allow executives to bail out from a hostile takeover battle with
financial security; hence, the nickname "golden parachute." See, e.g., Morrison, Those Execu-
tive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 82, 84 (Mr. Agee, Chief Executive Officer of
Bendix Corp., received a $4 million golden parachute); Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1982, at 2, col. 2
(Bendix Corp. granted certain key executives right to three year base salary and incentive
compensation payments if control were to change).
The justification for these agreements is that management, fortified with the knowledge
that they will be financially secure no matter who wins a control battle, will be able to accept
or reject a tender offer strictly on the merits. See Moore, Golden Parachute Agreements Shelter
Displaced Executives, Legal Times, Oct. 25, 1982, at 5, col. I (golden parachutes are necessary
to protect key executives in "an age of corporate cannibalism").
Critics of the golden parachute agreements charge that directors who benefit from these
agreements violate their duty of undivided loyalty to the company. See Johnson, Anti-Take-
over Action and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51, 70
(1982) (incentive to inform and protect shareholders might take second place to potential fi-
nancial windfall). Critics charge that directors utilize corporate funds to protect their position
or to ensure large severance payments in the event they lose their job when control changes.
Morrison, supra, at 83. Critics also argue that these contracts may have the effect of reducing
the price per share of the tender offer to reflect the cost of these agreements. Johnson, supra, at
70. Furthermore, they may have the effect of discouraging all tender offers, some of which may
be in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders, because a successful bidder may
incur large payments to departing target management. Cf. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Bass, 576 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 (N.D. Il. 1983) (golden parachutes constituted a breach of the
statutory duty of officers to prohibit employment agreements constituting an unsafe or un-
sound practice).
5. See infra note 21 & accompanying text. These defensive tactics indicate that target
management has a substantial interest in preserving its salaries and status. The directors' deci-
sion to resist a tender offer may be motivated more by a desire to retain control than by
concern for the welfare of the shareholders.
6. See infra note 22 & accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98 & accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., infra note 81 & accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
TENDER OFFER DEFENSIVE TACTICS
competing interests presented in a tender offer to gain wide acceptance. 9
Moreover, if regulation is needed, the appropriate agent for regulation,
either the states or the federal government, should be identified.
This Commentary reviews and evaluates the current state of the reg-
ulation of tender offer defensive tactics, as well as certain existing propos-
als for reform. The Commentary proposes a modification of existing
state corporate statutes to provide a definitive standard for regulating
defensive tactics. Part I delineates the current state of both the relevant
statutory law and common law. Part II first analyzes the relevant court
decisions and concludes that the current judicial regulation of defensive
tactics is deficient. Part II then discusses and rejects judicial and schol-
arly proposals thus far advanced for curing this deficiency. Part III com-
pares the current law governing defensive tactics with the status of the
freeze-out mergers in the mid 1970's and draws some lessons for the de-
fensive regulation of tactics from the resolution of the freeze-out issue.
Finally, in Part IV the author proposes that defensive tactics be regulated
by substituting the current subjective standard for defensive tactics with
an objective procedural test at the state level requiring a shareholder vote
to authorize any defensive tactic.
The Law Governing Defensive Tactics
The Director's Fiduciary Duty Under the Business Judgment Rule
One possible mechanism to regulate the defensive tactics of target
management in a hostile tender offer is the application of the business
judgment rule, which shields directors from liability if they fulfill their
common law fiduciary duties. 10 Directors may satisfy those duties by
acting as prudent business managers, in good faith, and in a manner rea-
sonably calculated to ensure that they operate the corporation for the
9. For criticism of judicial application of the business judgment rule, see infra notes 56-
67 & accompanying text. For criticism of judicial application of the "fairness" doctrine, see
infra notes 81-87 & accompanying text. For a critique of the proposal offered by Judge Easter-
brook and Professor Fischel, see infra notes 92-94 & accompanying text. For a critique of the
solution offered by Professor Gilson, see infra text accompanying note 104. For a critique of
Professor Lowenstein's proposal, see infra notes 108-13 & accompanying text.
10. See eg., Glassberg v. Boyd, 35 Del. Ch. 293, 308, 116 A.2d 711, 719 (1955) (holding
that presumption of good faith protected directors who were not liable for payment of out-of-
state tax subsequently declared unconstitutional); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 InI. App. 2d 173,
180-81, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968) (declining to interfere with business judgment of board of
directors of baseball team not to schedule night home games); Hornstein v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 292 N.Y. 468, 471, 55 N.E.2d 740, 741 (1944) (per curiam) (upholding business
judgment of directors in paying racketeers in violation of labor relations act).
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benefit of its shareholders. 11 Fulfillment of their fiduciary duties frees di-
rectors from liability for good faith errors in judgment. Furthermore, the
business judgment rule protects directors from liability for decisions that,
although properly made, produce poor results.
Three traditional justifications for the business judgment rule have
been developed. First, the rule allows directors the freedom to formulate
effective corporate policy. 12 Second, the rule encourages competent peo-
ple to become directors by alleviating their fear of personal liability for
honest mistakes in judgment. ' 3 Third, the rule relieves courts of the bur-
den of second-guessing complex corporate decisions, a task for which
courts often lack the necessary expertise, information, and time.' 4 The
business judgment rule thus articulates the principle that although share-
holders have a right to expect their directors to exercise due care and
undivided loyalty to the corporation, they cannot expect directors to
guarantee the success of their decisions.15
11. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The director must exer-
cise his management duties honestly and in good faith:
[A] director owes loyalty and allegiance to the company-a loyalty that is undivided
and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no consideration other than the
welfare of the corporation. Any adverse interest of a director will be subjected to a
scrutiny rigid and uncompromising. He may not profit at the expense of his corpora-
tion and in conflict with its rights; he may not for personal gain divert unto himself
the opportunities which in equity and fairness belong to his corporation. He is re-
quired to use his independent judgment. In the discharge of his duties a director
must, of course, act honestly and in good faith, but that is not enough. He must also
exercise some degree of skill and prudence and diligence.
Id. at 677-78; see also Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(directors are under a duty to exercise best judgment with respect to any proposal pertaining to
corporate affairs); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(directors have an affirmative duty to use best judgment for the corporation); Bodell v. General
Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 129, 132 A. 442, 446 (1926) ("There is no rule better
settled . . . than that directors in their conduct of the corporation stand in the situation of
fiduciaries."), afi'd, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927). See generally Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105 (1979) (directors owe fiduciary duty to share-
holders to act as prudent business managers in good faith on reasonable basis of assurance that
business operates for benefit of shareholders) [hereinafter cited as Lipton, Takeover Bids].
12. See generally Block & Prussian, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Deriv-
ative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32 (1981) (rule affords directors broad discre-
tion needed to formulate company policy without fear of judicial second-guessing).
13. See id. (quoting Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829)).
14. See Block & Prussian, supra note 12, at 33 (the most important rationale is to avoid
over-burdening the courts); see also Auerbauch v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (rule is partly grounded in "the prudent recognition
that courts are ill-equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essen-
tially business judgments").
15. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829). In Percy, the court stated
that "the contrary doctrine [to the rule that directors need only possess ordinary knowledge]
seems to us to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect wisdom in fallible
(Vol. 36THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
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The Problems of Proof in Establishing a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have ful-
filled their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The plaintiffs thus bear
the burden of establishing that the directors have abused their fiduciary
duties by either acting without care or disregarding their duty of loyalty
and allowing impermissible personal motives to dominate their
decisions.16
To prove that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care in
the tender offer context, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the directors
did not ascertain the relevant facts before reaching their decision.17 For
example, the directors may have failed to consider alternative proposals
and competing offers, 18 or they may have neglected to obtain the advice
of outside experts, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment bank-
ers. 19 In contrast to the concrete steps that demonstrate whether direc-
tors have fulfilled their duty of care, proof that directors have violated
human beings. No man would undertake to render service to another in such severe condi-
tions." Id.
16. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must
prove bad faith, self dealing, or fraud to raise inference that impermissible motives
predominate board's action), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff must show directors acted in bad faith, or in further-
ance of their own interests or some other improper purposes); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (business judgment rule places burden on shareholders to show imper-
missible motives), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1924) (burden on plaintiff to show defendant director's fulfillment of fiduciary du-
ties would have prevented loss); Auerbauch, 47 N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 926 (plaintiff must prove bad faith or fraud).
17. See, eg., Barnes, 298 F. at 615 (duty of director to keep himself informed); Kamin v.
American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 813-14, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct.) (board
decision upheld where finance committee minutes showed directors had considered various
proposed plans), afl'd, 54 N.Y.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1976).
18. See, eg., Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323-24 (Del. Ch. 1979) (directors failed
to fulfill duty of due care when they authorized sale of assets while ignoring competing offer at
significantly higher price); see also Kamin, 86 Misc. 2d at 813-14, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (board
decision upheld where minutes of special board meeting showed directors considered various
proposed plans).
19. Directors are generally permitted to rely reasonably, and in good faith on experts
chosen with due care. See, eg., Panter, 486 F. Supp. at 1194 (directors entitled to rely on
outside experts); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 507, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964) (in deciding
to repurchase raider's stock, directors properly relied on reports of investment bankers and
corporate officers that showed raider had "bad reputation" in the business community and
might attempt to liquidate target to obtain quick profit); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556,
568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (board properly relied on reports of investment bankers in setting price for
stock repurchase). Furthermore, some state corporation laws expressly permit reliance on ex-
perts. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 35,48 (rev. ed. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(e) (1974 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1984).
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their duty of loyalty is more elusive. Although the rule that directors
must act in good faith for the corporate, rather than a personal, benefit20
is simply stated, proving the directors' motives is problematic.
The duty of loyalty is difficult to apply in the tender offer context
because hostile tender offers create a conflict of interest between target
management and the corporation's shareholders. 21 On the one hand, a
new management resulting from a hostile transfer of control, a higher
price per share made possible by an auction among bidders, or even the
simple ability to sell their stock at a premium above the market price
may be in the best interests of the target shareholders. On the other
hand, target management's desire to maintain control may spur its resist-
ance to tender offers that are consistent with the financial interests of the
corporation, but jeopardize the directors' status and salaries. Indeed,
such self-interest may result in the use of defensive tactics that could
operate to the financial detriment of both the corporation and its
shareholders.
Despite target management's inherent conflict of interest in deciding
whether to employ defensive tactics, recent state and federal decisions
consistently have applied the business judgment rule to these manage-
ment decisions.22 Although directors have devised and implemented far
reaching defensive tactics, the courts have steadfastly adhered to the
business judgment rule without regard to the effectiveness or novelty of
20. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1934) (director may
not divert a corporate opportunity for personal gain), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935); Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (directors may not use corporate
personnel, facilities, or funds for personal gain); Flynn v. Zimmerman, 23 Ill. App. 2d 467,
476, 163 N.E. 2d 568, 578 (1960) (director must make full disclosure to corporation that in
selling property to corporation he is receiving a personal gain).
21. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981) (when
stock purchase occurs in context of tender offer, directors have inherent conflict of interest)
(citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)); Northwest Indus., Inc.
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (whenever management of target
resists tender offer, officers and directors may be accused of preserving their jobs at the expense
of the corporation).
22. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 383 (2d Cir. 1980) (construing
New Jersey statute requiring disinterested directors to approve contract between corporation
and another director to protect directors under business judgment rule); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors entering into merger agree-
ment to prevent hostile takeover protected by business judgment rule under New York law);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (business judgment rule under Dela-
ware law protects majority unless retaining control is the sole motive), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981); Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554 (directors' use of corporate funds to
purchase its shares held by an outsider seeking control at excessive prices was within directors'
business judgment).
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these tactics. 23 Courts applying this flexible standard have overwhelm-
ingly held that plaintiffs did not establish the requisite level of proof of
management self-interest to overcome the presumption of the business
judgment rule.
For example, in Mills v. Esmark, Inc.24 and Whittaker Corp. v. Ed-
gar,25 the district court evaluated according to the business judgment
rule the target boards' decisions to grant golden parachute contracts26 to
senior executives and to sell the target's crown jewel. 27 In Buffalo Forge
23. One defensive tactic recently attempted was the creation of an employee benefit plan.
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., No. 84-7360 (2d Cir. June 27, 1984). In response to a
purchase of almost one third of Norlin's common stock, the board of directors of Norlin, inter
alia, transferred a block of stock to a newly created ESOP to solidify management's control.
Id. The court held that the board's actions were not fair and reasonable, and stated that it has
never sanctioned a board's decision to lock-up voting power in an effort to buy time during an
attempted takeover. Id.; see also Ruling Narrows Defensive Actions To Deter Takeovers, Legal
Times, July 2, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (discussing Norlin).
Several cases have addressed the issue of creating an ESOP as a defensive tactic in the
context of a proxy battle. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 234 (9th Cir. 1975)
(creation of employee stock ownership trust as defensive tactic in proxy battle not sufficiently
compelling business purpose and therefore management breached its fiduciary duty); Podesto
v. Calumet Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,433, at 93,557
(1978) (creation of employee plan as means to ensure control in proxy contest was a violation
of the directors' fiduciary duty and not protected by the business judgment rule because the
primary, if not sole, purpose for creation of the plan was to entrench target management in
control of corporation). Contra Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., Civ.
No. 81-1831 LTL (kx) (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1981), af'd., No. 81-5114 (9th Cir. June 18, 1981).
The investment portfolio of a target's employee benefit plan generally contains a signifi-
cant amount of target stock. Pitt & Miles, The Use of Corporate Employee Benefit Plans in
Hostile Takeovers, in NEW TECHNIQUE IN ACQUISITIONS & TAKEOVERS 506 (Bialkin,
Fleischer & Greene eds. 1983). If target management has control or even influence over the
target's benefit plan, the extent to which the plan owns target stock could be instrumental in
formulating the target's response to a tender offer. The plan could theoretically tender to the
offeror, sell its shares in the open market, sell its shares to a party designated by target manage-
ment, hold them, or attempt to purchase additional target shares. Id. If the plan holds a large
amount of target stock, its response could be pivotal in ensuring the success or failure of a
tender offer because of the significant voting power localized in the plan.
Frequently, corporate officers serve as trustees of their corporation's benefit plan. When
the officers serve in this capacity and the plan owns a block of the corporation's stock, the
target officers, in a hostile tender offer, face a potential conflict of interest. On the one hand, as
corporate officers, they owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. On the
other hand, as trustees of the benefit plan, they owe a fiduciary duty to the plan and its partici-
pants. It may, for example, be in the best interests of the target corporation to fight the tender
offer, but nevertheless in the best interests of the plan's participants for the plan to tender its
stock to the bidder and thereby obtain the premium associated with the offer.
24. 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
25. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.), afi'd, No. 82-1305 (7th Cir. 1982).
26. See supra note 4 & accompanying text.
27. The target's sale of its crown jewel is but one form of "lock-up," namely, an arrange-
ment by which the target corporation in a hostile takeover gives one bidder a competitive
January 1985]
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Co. v. Ogden Corp.,28 the Second Circuit confirmed that the business
judgment rule applied to lock-ups.29 In addition, in Pogo Producing Co.
v. Northwest Industries, Inc.,30 a federal district court reaffirmed the
broad scope and applicability of the business judgment rule to target
management's defensive measures, including issuer tender offers.31 Fi-
nally, in Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp.,32 the Maryland district
court accepted the Pac-Man defense 33 as a valid defensive tactic that the
business judgment rule would protect. 34  In essence, the courts have
treated management decisions made during a hostile tender offer like
other difficult issues that a board of directors often faces.
advantage over other actual or potential bidders for the target's stock. For a further explana-
tion of lock-ups, see infra note 29.
28. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 550 (1983).
29. Id. at 759. In addition to the crown jewel option, the most common kinds of lock-ups
are the stock purchase agreement and the stock option agreement. The stock purchase and
stock option lock- up consist of an agreement with or option to the friendly offeror to purchase
the target's treasury shares or authorized but unissued shares that may have special voting
rights. As a result, the bidder holding this agreement or option has the advantage of a large
initial equity position in the target and perhaps special voting privileges, either of which has
the desired effect of discouraging hostile bidders. But see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d 366, 374-75 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up options to sell significant oil reserves found
manipulative and therefore violative of § 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The dan-
ger of lock-ups is that they often disregard the best interests of the shareholders, while protect-
ing directors. Target directors will likely have greater job security if control shifts to a friendly
bidder who has been given a lock-up option. The ultimate result, however, may be that the
shareholders receive a lower price for their tendered stock than would be generated through
unrestrained competitive bidding.
30. Civ. No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1984).
31. The target company employing a self-tender as a defensive tactic is faced with several
problems. First, target shareholders may be unwilling to risk proration of their shares in the
hands of the target, even for a higher price, if the limited self-tender is in response to an any-
and-all cash tender offer by the raider. Second, the self-tender might cause the target to incur
excessive debt in an effort to purchase its outstanding shares. Third, because repurchased
shares are treated as treasury shares, they may not be voted pursuant to the corporate law of
most states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (1974 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 515 (McKinney 1978). Because the repurchased shares may not be voted, the self-
tender ironically may serve to increase the offeror's percentage of shares outstanding and
therefore result in a successful bid.
An issuer tender offer deters hostile takeovers in two ways. First, the issuer offer, particu-
larly if the price exceeds the hostile offer, may cause the price of the target stock to rise. If the
stock price rises, it becomes more expensive for the offeror to acquire the target. Secondly, the
reduction in the number of outstanding shares caused by the issuer tender offer may make it
impossible for the offeror to purchase enough stock to meet its goal if the remaining outstand-
ing shares are friendly to target management.
32. 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
33. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
34. Bendix, 549 F. Supp. at 633-34. The court also found that no violation of the federal
securities laws occurred. Id. at 631 (no "plans" or "detailed schemes" were created; therefore,
no violation of § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 existed for failure to disclose).
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The consequence of treating decisions to engage in defensive tactics
like other business decisions is that courts presume the directors have
fulfilled their fiduciary duties unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate that
the directors' personal interests thwarted their duty of loyalty.35
Although acknowledging that target directors frequently are motivated,
at least to some degree, by the desire to remain in office, courts have
concluded that decisions made with such self-interest do not constitute
per se a breach of loyalty. 36 Therefore, the courts require proof of more
than a mere desire to remain in control before they will find a breach of
loyalty and deny the protection of the business judgment rule.
Although courts have phrased the standard of proof in different
ways, a series of decisions has established a high threshhold for plaintiffs
to prove that the directors' defensive tactics constituted a breach of their
loyalty. 37 One component of the standard is the presumption that man-
agement decisions to defend against hostile takeovers are valid. For ex-
ample, in Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar,38 the federal district court held that
the decision of the target board to sell its crown jewel39 enjoyed a pre-
sumption of sound business judgment that the court will not disturb if
35. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 789 (2d Cir. 1983) (mis-
take for court to substitute its business judgment for directors'); Pogo Prod. Co. v. Northwest
Indus., Civ. No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1984); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F.
Supp. 1128, 1138 (D. Or. 1984) (evidence showed that directors' recommended price per share
was in the best interest of stockholders and not for any self-interest); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (presumption that directors act on informed basis in good faith and
in best interests of company in making business decisions).
36. In Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981),
the court explained that a director has a certain amount of self-interest in everything he does.
Id. at 292. The business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem by validating certain
situations that otherwise would constitute a conflict of interest. Id.
37. Johnson, 629 F.2d at 293 (plaintiff must show that motive to retain control was pri-
mary or sole purpose); Panter v. Marshall Field Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(plaintiff must show fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, or abuse of discretion), aft'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (plaintiff
must show gross, not just simple, negligence).
In a few cases, the courts have applied a "primary purpose" test that purports to invali-
date target management's defensive action if the primary goal was to maintain management's
control. See, e.g., Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967)
(target board's issuance of stock to friendly persons in order to frustrate a takeover was not
self-serving). Although the primary purpose formulation sounds more strict than the business
judgment rule, in practice there is little difference between the two. A. FLEISCHER, TENDER
OFFERS; DEFENSES, RESPONSE AND PLANNING, 88-5 to 88-4 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Targets'Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1022-23 (1981) (pri-
mary purpose test and business judgment rule essentially demand no more than good faith and
due care) [hereinafter cited as Lipton, An Update].
38. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill), affid, No. 82-1305 (7th Cir. 1982).
39. See supra note 3 & accompanying text.
January 1985]
the decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.40
Moreover, other courts have required a showing of bad faith to
overcome the presumption of validity. In Treadway Companies v. Care
Corp.,41 the Second Circuit, reviewing the decision of Treadway's board
to fight a tender offer by selling stock to "friendly hands, '42 held that the
plaintiff must show that the directors "acted in bad faith, or in further-
ance of their own interests, or for some other improper purpose. '43 Simi-
larly, in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,44 the Seventh Circuit,
considering the target's acquisitions that created an antitrust claim
against the bidder,45 held that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of
showing that the defendant board had breached its fiduciary duties be-
cause the plaintiff had presented no evidence of bad faith, self-dealing,
fraud, or overreaching "sufficient to give rise to any reasonable inference
that impermissible motives predominated in the board's consideration of
the takeover proposal."'46
The effect of rebutting the presumption highlights the degree of
protection that the business judgment rule provides. A plaintiff who
demonstrates management's improper motive only shifts to the directors
the burden of proving that the primary reason for their disputed decision
was to further a legitimate business purpose. Contrary to the plaintiff's
burden, management's burden on rebuttal is easily met. A number of
business reasons can be proffered to explain why a target may consider a
takeover undesirable and decide to resist. For example, the target board
may consider the offering price inadequate or the selling time inappropri-
ate;47 management may seek to protect the corporation's direction or
40. Whittaker, 535 F. Supp. at 950-51; see also Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc.,
592 F. Supp. 203, 225 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (refusing to question business judgment of directors
without showing of bad faith).
41. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. The sale of authorized but unissued stock to "friendly hands," an ally who is likely to
side with management in a contest for control, can be an effective defensive tactic. Both the
New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, however, require shareholder
approval if the stock sale constitutes 20% or more of the corporation's outstanding stock.
NYSE Company Manual A-284; AMEX Company Guide § 713. The placement of stock in
friendly hands is frequently accompanied by a "standstill agreement," limiting the buyer's
right to acquire more shares or dispose of the newly acquired shares as a block.
43. Treadway, 638 F.2d at 381.
44. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
45. Id. at 297. After the President of Carter-Hawley-Hale indicated he would begin a
takeover for Marshall Field, Marshall Field purchased competitors of the bidder and then
initiated an antitrust suit against Carter-Hawley-Hale. Id.
46. Id. at 279-80.
47. Lipton, An Update, supra note 37, at 1026-28 (outlining procedures to be followed by
board confronted with a hostile tender offer).
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continued existence; or, it may determine that significant legal impedi-
ments bar consummation of the takeover. 48 In fact, even a motive to per-
petuate incumbent management's control can constitute a proper
business purpose if consistent with the corporation's best interests.49
By endowing directors' decisions to engage in defensive tactics with
the same protection granted to routine board decisions, the courts have
sidestepped the inherent conflict of interest confronting target manage-
ment engaged in defensive tactics. Despite the likelihood that the direc-
tors' desire to retain control, rather than the interests of the corporation,
may be the primary motive for defensive tactics, the courts have taken a
hands-off approach to these loyalty cases and have permitted target man-
agement great freedom to devise and to implement defensive tactics that
could hinder the shareholders' ability to tender their stock.
Fiduciary Duties Under Statutory Corporate Law
In addition to common law principles of fiduciary law, state corpo-
ration statutes contain several provisions that can be relevant during a
tender offer.50 For example, corporations must act in accordance with
state requirements when they enact charter amendments incorporating
"shark repellant" provisions.51 Other corporate statutory provisions au-
48. Id.
49. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (directors not
liable where they sincerely believed that buying out dissident shareholder was necessary to
maintain proper business practices). Furthermore, in Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp.
294 (D. Del. 1981), the court observed that the board
can either show that some consideration other than the perceived threat to control
was the primary reason for the stock purchase; or it can admit that the stock
purchase was intended primarily as a defensive maneuver, and show that the direc-
tors reasonably determined that a change in control would constitute a "clear threat
to the future business or the existing, successful business policy" of the corporation.
Id. at 305.
50. In addition to regulating major corporate transactions, state corporate statutes regu-
late the conduct of directors. See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (rev. ed. 1979)
(director shall perform duty as director in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be
in the best interest of the corporation, and with such care as ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984) (director shall
perform duties in good faith in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation and with the care of an ordinarily prudent person); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984) (director to perform duties in good faith and with the degree
of care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use).
51. See generally Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-laws Tech-
niques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979) (discussing charter and by-law amendments to deter take-
overs). Shark repellents may be adopted to deter offers in general or to deter specific offers.
Even if the offeror is not deterred from making its offer, such structural changes can delay the
takeover attempt long enough to give the target a meaningful opportunity to consider and
implement specific defensive measures. Furthermore, even if the takeover attempt is success-
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thorizing dividend plans,52 by-law amendments, 53 the power to call a
ful, the implementation of shark repellents may serve to prevent quick takeovers, thus reduc-
ing the pressure on the target shareholders to tender their shares for the initial offering price.
Id. at 554.
The courts generally have upheld the use of traditional shark repellent provisions in the
corporate charter or by-laws if the provisions have been enacted properly, notwithstanding the
fact that they are specifically designed to discourage hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Seibert v.
Gulton Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 5631 (Del. Ch.), afj'd without opinion, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
In Seibert, the court upheld a charter provision enacted in accordance with statutory require-
ments mandating the approval of 80% of the shareholders for a takeover by a shareholder who
owned at least 5% of the target stock, unless the board approved the takeover before the
bidder acquired its 5%. Contra Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, Civ. No. 5798 (Del. Ch.) (target board's
attempt to alter the voting rights of existing shareholders by imposing an 80% supermajority
requirement for approval of a takeover was illegal because the few preferred shareholders, also
friendly to management, would then have been able to negate any tender offer), appeal denied,
405 A.2d 132 (Del. 1979).
52. Two types of dividend plans have gained popularity as defensive tactics: the warrant
dividend plan and the convertible preferred stock plan. The warrant dividend plan gives a
dividend to the target shareholders in the form of a warrant to buy target common stock. The
warrant is triggered either when a tender offer is made or when a substantial position in the
target corporation is acquired. Similarly, the convertible stock dividend plan gives stock divi-
dends in the form of convertible preferred stock that is convertible into common stock when
someone acquires a substantial position in the target corporation. See Note, Protecting Share-
holders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 1964, 1964-65 (1984).
The purpose of issuing these dividends is to assure that the shareholders obtain a fair price
in the event a tender offer is commenced. The plans, therefore, seek to deter (i) a two-step
merger process in which, by merger after a partial tender offer, nontendering shareholders can
be removed from the corporation at a price below that paid to tendering shareholders; or (ii) a
"bootstrap" acquisition by an offeror in which the offeror acquires less than 50% of the stock
in an initial tender and uses the assets of the target to effectuate a second-step merger at a later
date.
Although the plan may deter a raider, it also has costs to the target. The warrants create
a large overhang that may adversely affect the market price of the target's common stock as
well as inhibit common stock financing. Moreover, the plan deters friendly deals as well as
hostile deals unless the plan provides that the provisions are inapplicable when the triggering
transaction was approved by the target's existing board of directors.
The legality of these plans has just begun to be tested. The common charge that manage-
ment has promulgated the plans to secure its own position is unlikely to succeed. Because the
courts have given management wide leeway with other defensive tactics, and because this
tactic has benefits to the target shareholders lacking in other tactics, a charge that enactment
of these plans is a violation of management's duty of loyalty is unlikely. For example, recently
in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 7730 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985), the Delaware court
upheld, on the basis of the business judgment rule, a preferred stock dividend plan intended as
a defensive tactic to possible tender offers. The court said that the business judgment rule
would protect directors if the corporation adopted the dividend plan prospectively, rather than
during the heat of a takeover battle. Id.; see also Delaware Rulings Complicate Poison Pill
Picture, Legal Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
53. For example, the Delaware statute permits stockholders and, if the charter so pro-
vides, the directors of a Delaware corporation to amend the by-laws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 109(a) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
The primary issue in by-law amendments, as with other defensive tactics, is management's
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meeting of the stockholders, 54 and consent in lieu of a meeting of the
stockholders55 recently have emerged as pivotal factors in defending
against takeovers.
Like fiduciary law, the statutory law lacks a standard that is appro-
priate to resolve the issues raised by management's inherent conflict of
interest. Because the statutes delineate specific requirements, defendants
can argue convincingly that their duties of care and loyalty are satisfied
once they have complied with the statutory provisions. In deference to
the legislatures, courts refrain from imposing stricter fiduciary duties on
the theory that, if the legislatures wanted additional requirements, it
would have imposed them.
Such deference is inappropriate, however, because the legislatures
intended these provisions to govern decisions of ordinary corporate gov-
ernance, not the tender offer context. This distinction is critical because
we assume managers act for the corporate weal when, for example, they
propose a charter amendment or unilaterally revoke a by-law. In con-
trast, when management takes identical action in response to a tender
offer, the motive for such action must be questioned. Yet the relevant
state statutory law does not require motive to be considered.
motive in making the amendment. Simply because it is legally possible for target management
to amend the by-laws does not make it per se lawful to do so. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). Management's efforts to use the corporate machinery and
the state corporate law must be tested by whether its motive was to perpetuate itself in office or
to effectuate some corporate good. Id.
54. The differences in the state statutes empowering various parties to call a special meet-
ing of the stockholders is significant. The board always has this power. In a jurisdiction fol-
lowing the Delaware approach, no shareholder can call a meeting without by-law
authorization. Therefore, if the target did not enact a by-law negating the Delaware norm, the
offeror is disadvantaged because it will be required to wait until the next annual meeting of the
stockholders before it can replace the target's board of directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 211 (1974 & Supp. 1982). In a jurisdiction following the Maryland approach, however, any-
one owning 25% of the stock can call a meeting. In these jurisdictions an offeror would have
the advantage of being able to call a special meeting of the stockholders upon acquisition of the
statutorily decreed percentage of the target's stock. See MD. CORPS. & AS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 2-502 (1975 & Supp. 1983).
55., In Delaware, unless the corporate charter provides otherwise, if a stockholder has
votes sufficient to effectuate an action at a meeting of the stockholders, he may do so without a
meeting, notice, or vote. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1974 & Supp. 1982). In lieu of the
meeting, obtaining the requisite number of consents to effectuate the stockholder action will
suffice. In Maryland, however, no stockholder action may be taken without a meeting absent
unanimous consent by the stockholders. See MD. CORPS. & AWS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-505 (1975
& Supp. 1983).
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Deficiencies of the Current Practice and Alternative Proposals
Deficiencies of the Business Judgment Standard
As discussed in Part I, despite the conflict of interest faced by target
directors when confronted with a tender offer, most courts apply the
business judgment rule to the directors' decisions to engage in defensive
tactics just as the courts would apply the rule to any other corporate
transaction. When a court applies the rule to management's decisions to
engage in defensive tactics, however, it overlooks a central issue:
although the rule presupposes that the directors have fulfilled their fidu-
ciary duties of care and loyalty, 56 target directors may be diverted from
fulfilling that unbiased, selfless duty of loyalty57 because the tender offer
threatens the target management's job security. Although courts have
acknowledged this conflict, they have held that this conflict alone is in-
sufficient to deny the application of the rule. Courts have reasoned that
because the desire to remain in office motivates nearly all target director
decisions, plaintiffs must prove something more than an inherent conflict
for courts to deny the application of the business judgment rule.
Thus, a court may require the plaintiffs to prove that maintaining
control was management's sole, or at least primary, purpose in fighting
the tender offer.58 Generally, if management has acted to maintain its
control as well as to further a corporate interest, the courts have con-
cluded that management did not breach its duty of loyalty and, accord-
ingly, courts have applied the business judgment rule.59 This line of
reasoning, however, contains a significant flaw. Management often can
posit some legitimate corporate purpose for its conduct. Judicial inquiry
into management's motive, therefore, becomes a futile exercise in all but
the most blatant cases of management misconduct.
Other courts have implied that management can satisfy its duty of
56. See supra notes 16-21 & accompanying text.
57. In Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939), the court stated, "The rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest." Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
58. See supra notes 25, 30 & accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of whether courts place too much weight on the role of so called
"independent" directors, see Werner, Corporation Law in Search ofIts Future, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1611, 1656-58 (1981) (courts' deference to outside directors' judgment impairs share-
holders' protection against management abuses). See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,262, 92,265-66 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) (noting that directors each have, to some degree, a personal stake in outcome),
rev'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). Contra Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1231, 1235 (1980) (majority of directors often not affiliated with management and take respon-
sibilities to shareholders seriously) [hereinafter cited as Lipton, A Response].
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loyalty by fulfilling its duty of care. In Cheff v. Mathes,6° for example,
the directors of Holland Furnance Company, fearing a takeover, used
corporate funds to repurchase stock from a well-known "raider. ' 61 The
Delaware court decided that only those directors who had a personal
pecuniary interest in the repurchase had to prove their loyalty; all other
directors were entitled to the presumption of loyalty.62
In determining whether management acted for a corporate, rather
than a personal, benefit, however, the court in Cheff considered facts that
were more probative of whether management exercised due care.63 The
court noted that Holland's directors had solicited advice about the
raider, Holland's capital structure, and the proposed repurchase. 64 The
solicitation of advice the court cited, however, concerned the care exer-
cised by the board, but did not probe whether personal goals motivated
the repurchase. The court made no inquiry about whether Holland's
shareholders would be harmed or what Holland's directors would lose if
the raider were successful in its takeover. The court merely relied on the
determination of Holland's board that incumbent management would
better serve Holland.65
Thus, the court in Cheff blurred the distinction between the two
components of management's fiduciary duty to shareholders. Inquiry
into the duty of care is simpler than inquiry into the duty of loyalty be-
cause in establishing its duty of care management can demonstrate con-
crete steps it took to decide whether to fight the tender offer. In contrast,
the inquiry into management's motivation, which is necessary to deter-
60. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
61. Id. at 499-500, 199 A.2d at 551-52. Corporate funds were expended although one of
the directors, who was also a shareholder, was willing to buy the raider's stock. Id. at 502, 199
A.2d at 552-53.
62. Id. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554-55. By not requiring directors who did not have a per-
sonal pecuniary interest other than stock ownership to prove their loyalty, the court implicitly
held that the directors' fear of losing their positions did not create a sufficient conflict of inter-
est to warrant denial of the business judgment rule. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 507-08, 199 A.2d at 556. Shortly after trading in Holland's stock increased, the
raider announced to the board that he owned a substantial number of Holland shares. The
board investigated the financial and business history of the raider, learning that the raider had
participated in the liquidation of a number of companies for quick profits. Id.
65. Professor Gilson notes that the court in Cheff was ill-equipped to review the fairness
of management's decision, but was better able to inquire into management's motives. Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 828-29 (1981). The court required management to show that it had
made a reasonable investigation which showed a policy conflict between management and the
raider; this conflict afforded management decisions of the business judgment rule. Id.
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mine whether management has satisfied its duty of loyalty, is mired in
the difficulty of determining another person's primary motive.
Other courts following the reasoning in Cheff abdicated their re-
sponsibility to protect shareholders by policing management. Although
difficult, the analysis of management's loyalty is not a new task for
judges, who have made such evaluations in other contexts. 66 The fiduci-
ary duty of care is no substitute for the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
67
Deficiencies of the Statutory Standard
Judicial decisions that evaluate directors' conduct in a tender offer
context according to state statutory law, as if they were evaluating an
ordinary business decision, are also subject to criticism. The state corpo-
ration statutes reflect the state legislatures' judgment about the desirabil-
ity of shareholder involvement in certain corporate actions.68 For
example, some statutory sections permit management action without a
shareholder vote. 69 Legislatures designed such statutes, however, for cir-
cumstances that presuppose a specific standard of conduct: that manage-
ment's activities are guided by their fiduciary obligations. Thus, allowing
management to amend the by-laws to prevent shifts in control, albeit
amidst management allegations of corporate good, abuses the statutory
process because in the takeover context the prerequisite satisfaction of
fiduciary duties is not assured. Although acknowledging that the statu-
tory standard is oblivious to management's conflicts of interest, courts
essentially have ignored whether state corporation statutes actually au-
thorize management to defend against a takeover.
66. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (discussing manage-
ment's duty of loyalty not to appropriate corporate opportunity for itself), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 708 (1935); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512 (Del. Ch. 1978) (discussing directors' duty
not to usurp corporate opportunity); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93
A.2d 107 (1952) (analyzing directors' fiduciary duty in proposed merger of parent and subsidi-
ary corporations); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969) (discussing directors' fiduciary duty in trading of corporation's stock); Everett v. Phil-
lips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942) (looking to directors' duty of loyalty in dealings
between common corporations).
67. See Gilson, supra note 65, at 830-31 (incongruous to apply the duty of care standard
designed for nonconflict of interest business judgment situations to test for compliance with the
duty of loyalty which is at issue only in conflict of interest situations, such as management's
self-interest in defensive tactics).
68. For example, in mergers, sales of assets, liquidations, and charter amendments, stat-
utes require a shareholder vote. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (amending articles of
incorporation), § 251 (mergers), § 271 (sale of substantially all corporate assets), § 275 (disso-
lution) (1983).
69. For example, many statutes authorize management to amend the by-laws without
shareholder consent to allow management flexibility in running the corporation.
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The assumption that management has a right to take corporate ac-
tion in response to a tender offer should be questioned. Although most
statutes grant the directors broad powers to conduct the business of the
corporation,70 the statutes explicitly restrict the directors' role in transac-
tions outside the corporation's usual and ordinary business. Thus, stat-
utes require shareholder approval for corporate transactions such as
mergers, sales of assets, liquidations, and charter amendments. 71 Other
statutes nevertheless permit management action without a shareholder
vote in certain situations normally outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness. For example, many statutes authorize management to amend the
by-laws72 or to approve certain types of mergers without a shareholder
vote.73 Generally, however, state corporate statutes are silent as to target
management's role in the tender offer context. If the legislatures were
deliberately silent about target management's role in tender offers, two
theories may explain this statutory silence. According to one view, the
state legislatures refrained from authorizing tender offer defenses in rec-
ognition that tender offers can fulfill their function of displacing ineffi-
cient or self-dealing management only if target management is prevented
from exercising a veto power.74 For example, if the directors, whose ap-
proval is required under state law, refuse to approve the merger, the ac-
quiror can begin a tender offer. The threat of a tender offer would help
to constrain any management self dealing in its decision to reject the
merger. If a statute permitted target management to engage in effective
defensive tactics without shareholder approval, the bidder would be un-
able to take over the target without management's approval, and man-
agement self-dealing would be difficult to prevent. 75
Another explanation for the statutory silence is that tender offers,
unlike mergers or sales of corporate assets, are not corporate transac-
tions. Arguably, a tender offer is only a transfer of stock ownership, a
mere shareholder investment decision over which management should
70. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984).
71. See supra note 68.
72. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984).
73. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 251 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984).
74. Gilson, supra note 65, at 844 ("market for corporate control is the principal con-
straint on management self-dealing" and inefficiency). Professor Gilson suggests that the si-
lence may reflect the legislative presumption of the free alienation of property, whereby
management's nonrole is assumed. Id. at 849.
75. Id. at 844-45 (constraints on management decrease if incumbent management can
increase costs of tender offer).
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have neither control nor veto power. 76
Scholars who support an active management role in response to a
tender offer argue that although the tender offer is a stock purchase in
form, it is functionally equivalent to an asset purchase. 77 Proponents of
this theory maintain that because management controls the terms for a
sale of assets, it should also have broad discretionary authority in a
tender offer context. 78 State corporate statutes, however, often reject this
functional equivalence concept, reflecting the notion that the structure of
a transaction, rather than its result, determines the process. 79 Moreover,
although tender offer defensive tactics currently are the focus of much
attention, the state legislatures have not enacted provisions that create a
role for target management in tender offers comparable to its role in
either asset sales or merger. 80
The Fairness Test
Although courts -have acknowledged the inherent conflict of interest
in a tender offer context, they overwhelmingly have chosen to evaluate
management actions according to the business judgment rule rather than
conflict of interest principles. 81 In most jurisdictions, if a fiduciary has a
conflict of interest, common law or state statutory provisions uphold the
transaction in three circumstances: if independent directors approved
76. Cf id. at 849 (management need not have any affirmative role in tender offers). For
example, a shareholder owning a controlling block of stock may sell that block without any
approval from the corporation's officers, directors, or shareholders, even though the sale will
ultimately effect transfer of control over the corporation's assets. Id. at 849.
77. Gilson, supra note 65, at 848; see also Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Di-
rectors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC. 152, 154 (1979) (the only differ-
ence between a merger and tender offer is that a tender offer is made directly to shareholders);
Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 11, at 104, 116 (takeover bids are not substantially different
from other major business decisions); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover At-
tempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 882, 892 (1978) (tender offer is an alternative acquisition
technique, and "management's position [is] identical to that occupied in conventional statutory
merger or sale").
78. Gilson, supra note 65, at 848 & n.106.
79. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 13.1-77(d) (1978) (specifying that a transaction involving a sale
or exchange of assets "shall not be considered to be a merger or consideration").
80. Gilson, supra note 65, at 847-48 (merger process rests firmly in management's con-
trol, but statutes give no role to management in tender offers).
81. Several judges have expressed dissatisfaction with decisions applying the business
judgment rule to management's decisions to engage in defensive tactics. See, e.g., Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (emphatically disagreeing that the business judgment rule should clothe directors fend-
ing off a threat to their control), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 300-01 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (diffi-
cult to determine exactly what subjective motive was involved or whose motive was involved),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
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the transaction; if the shareholders approved the transaction; or if the
interested fiduciary proved the transaction was fair to the corporation.82
Because all the directors have an inherent conflict of interest in the
tender offer situation, 83 and they generally do not submit the transaction
to the shareholders for approval, the court's only option would be to
require that the directors prove the "fairness" of the questioned defensive
tactic.84
Evaluation of the fairness of defensive tactics is complex. The focus
of the inquiry is not whether management wasted the corporation's assets
or whether target management received a fair price, but whether it.was
fair for management to have undertaken the defensive transaction at all,
at any price. For example, if target management repurchased an insur-
gent's stock, a fairness test would necessarily focus on the fairness of
preventing a shift in control,85 rather than the fairness of the repurchase
price, because "management's conflict of interest goes not to the com-
mercial reasonableness of the defensive action's terms, but to the decision
to block a change in control."'86
If a court must decide whether the defensive tactic was appropriate
at any price, however, the court is in the position of inquiring into an
area that it is not equipped to handle: evaluating complex corporate deci-
sions. Because one justification for the creation of the business judgment
rule was to avoid the necessity for the courts to make complex business
82. See, ag., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 41(1979); CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West
1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984); see also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.,
109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952) (transaction between corporation and inter-
ested directors not void under state corporation statute if interest is disclosed and transaction
approved by shareholders); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 278 N.E.2d 642, 646,
328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 437 (1972) (resolution valid if majority of disinterested directors vote in
favor.); cf. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976) (interpreting state corpora-
tion statute as merely removing the cloud on "interested director" when its terms are met).
83. See supra note 59 & accompanying text.
84. See, eg., Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. Professor Gilson has aptly analyzed the problem when management repurchases an
insurgent's stock:
Management's conflict of interest was not in the price paid, but in the decision to
acquire the shares at all. Applying a fairness standard to this decision, however,
requires a court to determine whether it was "fair" for control to remain with man-
agement rather than shift to the offeror. And this inquiry must necessarily focus on
whether the shareholders would be selling their shares. But this is an investment
decision, made continually by shareholders. . . and raises the same issue of judicial
competence which justifies a restrictive judicial role. ...
Gilson, supra note 65, at 827.
86. Id.
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decisions,87 it is not surprising that courts have invoked the business
judgment rule simply to avoid engaging in evaluations that would be re-
quired by the fairness test.
Scholarly Proposals for Legislation
Scholars have proposed legislation as an alternative to regulating de-
fensive tactics by the business judgment rule. 88 These proposals are pre-
mised on an evaluation of the inherent worth of tender offers as business
transactions, an evaluation which, because it entails determinations of
fact and policy, is within the province of the legislature, not the courts.
Because neither the business judgment rule nor the fairness test is well-
tailored to evaluate the competing interests inherent in defensive tactics,
the legislative proposals that follow may offer the best solution.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, rejecting the business
judgment rule as inappropriate for resolving the inherent conflict of in-
terest, have proposed legislation requiring the directors of a target to re-
main totally passive in the face of a takeover bid. 89 Judge Easterbrook
87. See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
88. The SEC recently endorsed most of the recommendations made by its Tender Offer
Advisory Committee. The SEC agreed with the Committee that target company defensive
tactics generally should be tested under the business judgment rule, but revised this rule to
place greater emphasis on potential conflicts of interest. The SEC also agreed that the use of
golden parachutes should be forbidden, but suggested that the tactic be prohibited at the threat
of a tender offer rather than at the commencement of an offer. The SEC accepted the Commit-
tee's recommendation that there be no general restrictions on counter tender offers, such as the
Pac-Man defense, so long as they reflect management's reasonable business judgment. The
SEC rejected the Committee's recommendation to forbid the use of charter and by-law de-
fenses as too intrusive into state corporate law. See SEC Endorses Most Tender Offer Advisory
Committee Recommendations, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1064, 1-3 (Mar. 21, 1984).
On May 22, 1984, the SEC proposed to Congress legislation requiring shareholder ap-
proval for two defensive tactics: the issuance of a new class of securities of more than 5% of
the issued and outstanding stock, and the repurchase of stock at a premium from anyone
owning more than 3% of the target's stock ("greenmail") for less than two years. In the latter
case, a shareholder referendum can be avoided if a similar offer is made to all the shareholders.
See H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5694, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R.
5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); see also S. 2754, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5972,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); SEC to Send Congress Tender Offer Reform Legislation, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) No. 1072, 2-3 (May 16, 1984).
89. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1194 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Share-
holders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1739 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel,
Takeover Bids]. The authors give two reasons why the business judgment rule is inapplicable
to a tender offer situation. First, the presumption that managers will make decisions that
maximize shareholders' welfare has never been applied where acute conflicts of interests arise,
such as in hostile tender offer situations which, "if successful, frequently result in the replace-
ment of incumbent managers." Id. at 1745. Second, "the rationale underlying the rule-the
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and Professor Fischel believe that tender offers should be encouraged be-
cause they benefit target shareholders and the economy by maximizing
share prices and reducing costs.90 Conversely, tactics that frustrate a
tender offer should be prohibited because they ultimately penalize the
economy. By discouraging the takeover,91 defensive tactics hinder the
movement of assets to more efficient management and shareholders.
Scholarly criticism of the Easterbrook-Fischel proposal focuses on
three points. First, some scholars challenge the premise that tender of-
fers benefit the economy. 92 Second, others dispute the conclusion that
passivity is the cure for target management's self-interest in the tender
offer context. For example, Mr. Lipton claims that target management is
able to engage in defensive conduct and to fulfill its fiduciary duties in a
tender offer. 93 Finally, certain scholars believe that the Easterbrook-Fis-
chel proposal wrongly focuses on the form of the tender offer transaction
rather than on its substance. In form, the tender offer entails many indi-
vidual investment decisions. In substance, however, the shareholders'
decisions collectively can effect a sale of the corporate assets. These crit-
ics of the Easterbrook-Fischel approach thus contend that target man-
agement should be allowed to bargain for the collective interest of the.
shareholders and the corporation. 94
Although the business judgment rule is ill-suited to governing defen-
sive tactics, and tender offers are more analogous to individual invest-
ment decisions than to corporate transactions such as asset sales or
mergers, this author does not agree that the resolution of these problems
lies in requiring management passivity. As Parts III and IV of this Com-
mentary explain in detail, 95 I believe the solution lies in allowing the
inability of courts to make better decisions than managers-is inapplicable to the tender offer
context." Id. at 1746. Tender offers do not involve management decisions, thus the courts
need not exercise business judgment to evaluate management. Id. Courts would be required
only to determine whether the managers were, in fact, passive. Id.
90. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 89, at 1734-39.
91. Id. The authors argue that we have an efficient market in which companies sell stock
for its current worth under existing management. Id.
92. See, e.g., Lipton, A Response, supra note 59, at 1232-33 ("economic benefits of take-
overs are debatable").
93. See id. at 1235.
94. See, eg., Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 11, at 115 (directors should consider long-
term interests of shareholders in deciding to accept or reject tender offer); Steinbrink, supra
note 77, at 891-92 (management is steward of shareholders' collective investment and must act
on their behalf in context of takeover); cf Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Take-
overs: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 267 (1983) (because tender offers
are highly coercive, there is a substantial risk that shareholders would accept individually an
offer they would reject collectively).
95. See infra notes 114-91 & accompanying text.
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shareholders to determine the permissible degree of management
involvement.
Professor Gilson has proposed legislation that is based on a distinc-
tion between defensive conduct in anticipation of a tender offer and de-
fensive conduct during the course of a tender offer.96 Gilson's proposal
circumscribes management's tactics only during a tender offer. Professor
Gilson argues that "the tender offer is the only displacement mechanism
which has the potential to effectuate" 97 some constraint on manage-
ment's self-dealing. 98 Thus, he contends that defensive tactics during a
tender offer should be banned 99 so that offerors have unrestricted access
to target shareholders.100 Professor Gilson would bar defensive tactics
only during a tender offer, however, because "pre-offer tactics are simply
less likely to be effective"101 and, in any event, can be regulated by tradi-
tional fiduciary standards. 10 2
To illustrate the ineffectiveness of pre-offer defenses, Professor Gil-
son discusses the defensive tactic of buying a company in the same line of
business as the offeror's business to create an antitrust barrier to the take-
over. He argues that this defensive tactic is ineffective in the pre-offer
period when the offeror's identity and line of business are unknown. 103
Moreover, Professor Gilson claims that diversification solely to create
antitrust barriers to any would-be raider is a poor business practice likely
to produce a decreased stock price and to render the company a more
attractive target.l°4
Although Professor Gilson is correct in the case of the antitrust bar-
rier defense, the deficiency of his pre-offer versus post-offer distinction is
apparent if the inquiry is expanded to other pre-offer tactics. Some pre-
offer tactics may be as effective defense weapons as some post-offer tac-
tics. For example, if management, prior to a tender offer, sells a large
block of stock to someone friendly to management with the understand-
ing that the block will not be tendered in a hostile tender offer, the tender
offer will encounter difficulty. Moreover, this strategy is effective
96. See Gilson, supra note 65, at 887 (target management's conduct should be limited
after learning of existence of tender offer).
97. Id. at 844.
98. Management, because of its veto power, is not constrained in mergers and sales of
assets. Similarly, proxy contests, because they are economically unattractive to challengers, do
not effectively prevent management self-dealing. Id. at 843-44 & n.95.
99. Id. at 846.
100. Id. at 845.
101. Id. at 888.
102. Id. at 890.
103. Id. at 888.
104. Id.
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whether taken prior to or after a tender offer. Thus, although Professor
Gilson seeks to protect shareholders from abusive defensive tactics, the
pre-offer/post-offer distinction fails to achieve adequate protection.
Professor Lowenstein has offered a third legislative proposal that
would amend the Williams Act to require that hostile takeover bids re-
main open for at least six months. 10 5 Professor Lowenstein proposes that
during this period the target should be barred from undertaking any
structural change without the approval of at least a majority of the tar-
get's shares.10 6 Generally, this proposal would cover transactions that
significantly affect corporate assets, capital structure, or voting rights.10
7
Two aspects of Professor Lowenstein's proposal, namely, the re-
quirements for shareholder approval of defensive tactics and a longer du-
ration for tender offers bids, are sound. Professor Lowenstein's proposal
is objectionable, however, because he seeks to regulate only post-offer
defensive tactics108 and would achieve that result through the federal
law,109 thus pre-empting state law efforts at regulation. Although he
concedes that "any federal scheme by which target boards of directors
are forced to submit for shareholder approval matters ordinarily author-
ized by board action alone must have some impact on state authority,"110
105. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 317-18, 322-23 (discussing need for open offer period to
allow a shareholder vote). The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968),
added §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1981 & Supp. 1984)). Currently, SEC regulations require
tender offers, with limited exceptions, to remain open for 20 business days. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-1 (1984).
106. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 317.
107. Professor Lowenstein defines "structural change" as
(a) any acquisition or disposition of any significant amount of assets otherwise than
in the ordinary course of business, any issuance or repurchase of 5% or more of any
class of equity securities, or any agreement'or arrangement for any of the foregoing,
or (b) any other transaction or action whether or not comprehended by clause (a)
which, under such rules as the [Securities Exchange] Commission shall prescribe,
shall be deemed reasonably likely to affect significantly any of the following: (i) the
business or assets of the company, (ii) the financial condition or capital structure of
the company, or (iii) the voting rights of any class of securities of the company ....
Id. at 317-18.
108. Professor Lowenstein recognizes this criticism, but rejects relentless pursuit of defen-
sive tactics because federal regulation of all defensive tactics would "intrude too deeply into
areas traditionally reserved to the states." Id. at 322.
109. Professor Lowenstein argues that his proposal would not be the first to infuse sub-
stantive-rather than purely disclosure-issues into the Williams Act. Id. at 321. His propo-
sal is objectionable not because it imposes substance, but rather because that substance-
requiring a shareholder vote-is a state matter. See also ABA Votes Against Federal Corporate
Legislation, Legal Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 4, col. 1 (rejecting Congress' attempts to "federal-
ize" state corporation laws).
110. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 322.
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he justifies this intrusion into state law because he perceives a futility in
regulating defensive tactics on a state-by-state basis.III
To the extent that tender offers affect interstate commerce, regula-
tion at the federal level is justifiable. 112 Although interstate commerce is
affected, much of the tender offer process is actually a state matter. For
example, states historically have defined the rights of shareholders with
respect to the corporation as well as with respect to their stock; state law
delineates those transactions that require a shareholder vote, as well as
management's role in such transactions. Thus, federal law requiring a
shareholder vote to authorize defensive tactics would be an unwarranted,
and perhaps unprecedented, 1 3 intrusion into state corporate governance.
Although state regulation is likely to result in less uniformity than fed-
eral regulation, variation in state corporate laws is an accepted norm.
Lack of uniformity among state laws is not tantamount to futility or
inefficiency.
In summary, the deficiencies of the business judgment rule and the
fairness test have encouraged some legal scholars to propose legislation
to police management conduct in defending against tender offers. These
proposals either lack adequate safeguards for shareholders or challenge
the traditional notion that corporate governance is within the purview of
the states. The necessity for legislative action to protect shareholders in
this relatively new, but important, area is, however, gaining acceptance.
A Lesson from the Law of Freeze-Out Mergers
Current law regarding freeze-out mergers provides useful parame-
ters for fashioning suitable tender offer legislation. The current defi-
ciency of state tender offer law parallels in many respects the inchoate
condition of the law of freeze-out mergers" 4 in the mid 1970's. The
111. Id.
112. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982) (holding state takeover statute an
unconstitutional violation of the commerce clause).
113. Professor Lowenstein's other examples of federal intrusions into state governance are
unpersuasive. He argues that the Investment Company Act limits the right of registered in-
vestment companies to pay dividends and issue senior securities, in addition to restricting the
composition of the board. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 321; see Investment Company Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-16, 80a-18 (1982). He also states that the Trust Indenture Act and the proxy
rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain provisions that relate to internal corpo-
rate governance. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 321-22; see Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53
Stat. 1149 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982)); see also Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). The primary purpose of both the Trust Indenture Act
and the proxy rules, however, is to regulate disclosure, a function that traditionally falls within
the scope of federal legislation.
114. In a freeze-out merger, the controlling shareholders of a corporation typically form a
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evolution of the law regulating freeze-out mergers may be instructive in
developing standards to govern target management's defensive tactics.
The Analogy Between Freeze-Out Merger Regulation and Tender Offer
Regulation
Corporate management can conduct freeze-out mergers and tender.
offer defenses entirely within the letter of the merger provisions of the
state corporate statutes." 5 In the early freeze-out cases, courts generally
took refuge in these statutes and held in favor of the controlling share-
holders when they had fulfilled the statutory requirements. 16 Neither
courts nor state legislatures distinguished freeze-out mergers from tradi-
tional mergers," 7 despite management's self-interest in a freeze-out
new corporation, contribute their stock for all shares in the newly formed corporation, and
vote to merge the two corporations. The terms of the merger, controlled by the majority,
provide that equity shares in the original corporation will be exchanged for cash or nonequity
instruments. In this way minority shareholders are forced out of their equity positions and
management strengthens its hand. "Going private" is a subset of freeze-out mergers in which
a public corporation reverts to private status as a result of the freeze-out's elimination of the
public shareholders. Another kind of freeze-out that is gaining tremendous popularity is the
leveraged buyout. A leveraged buyout is a transaction in which borrowings are used to fund
all or a large part of the purchase price of a business; a relatively small portion of the purchase
price is funded by equity. See Frome & Getzoff, Structuring the Buyout, in HANDBOOK OF
MERGERS, AcQUISITIONS AND BuYouTs 517 (Lee & Coleman eds. 1981). When used as a
defensive tactic, the target's principal shareholders or a "white knight" buys out the target.
Other common methods of effectuating a freeze-out are a tender offer followed by a cash-out
merger, and a cash-out merger between a parent and its subsidiary. For a discussion of the
various techniques to effectuate a freeze-out, see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or
No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974).
115. The merger and appraisal sections of the corporate statute will govern these transac-
tions. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1100, 1110, 1300 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253, 262 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 901, 905, 910 (McKinney 1963
& Supp. 1983-1984).
116. See, eg., Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 520, 154 A.2d
893, 897 (1959) (short-form merger statute empowers parent to cash-out minority stockhold-
ers); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) (no
preliminary injunction absent showing of unfairness in long-form merger); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce
Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961) (absent fraud or unfairness, court's policy is to
permit corporations to take advantage of statutory device for consolidation). But see David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968) (directors have burden
to show fairness of long-form merger where directors are on both sides).
117. The availability of appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders in a merger also en-
couraged the courts to take a hands-off policy with freeze-outs. See, e.g., Yanow v. Teal In-
dus., Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 278, 422 A.2d 311, 317 (1979) (appraisal rights exclusive remedy for
dissenters under short-form merger statute); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) (minority's only recourse is appraisal); Pupecki v. James
Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 216, 382 N.E. 2d 1030, 1033 (1978) (appraisal exclusive rem-
edy unless plaintiff shows fraud).
Most statutes provide that appraisal rights are a dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy
unless the shareholder can prove that the corporate action was fraudulent with regard to the
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merger. In traditional mergers, target management negotiates at arms'
length with the management of an unrelated corporation. In a freeze-out
merger, however, management essentially deals with itself because the
majority shareholders usually represent management; thus, management
is on both sides of the transaction. Moreover, in a freeze-out merger the
majority shareholders decide when, and on what terms, the minority
shareholders will be expelled from the corporation, leaving the majority
shareholders as the sole owners of the corporate assets. As long as the
freeze-out merger met the statute's merger requirements, however, state
courts did not further regulate the freeze-out and management's self-
dealing went unchecked.
Frustrated by the state courts' hands-off approach, minority share-
holders turned to the federal courts for relief. Plaintiffs claimed that the
freeze-out mergers, and the consequent undervaluation of their shares,
violated the antifraud provision of the federal securities laws.ll8 At first,
plaintiffs met with some success. 119 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,12 0 however, the United States Supreme Court held that absent
fraud, a freeze-out merger accompanied by full disclosure did not fall
within the parameters of the federal securities laws. 12  Thus, minority
shareholders had no recourse but the state courts.
Corporate managers, therefore, were immune from federal liability,
if they made a full disclosure, and relatively safe from state liability, if
they followed the requirements of the merger statutes. This attitude,
complaining shareholder. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 80 (1979); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 98 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984).
More recently, however, some state courts have held that shareholders dissenting in
freeze-out mergers are entitled to equitable remedies in addition to appraisal. See infra notes
125-32 & accompanying text; see also Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najiar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del.
1979) (majority shareholders' fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in freeze-out not satis-
fied by appraisal rights); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977)
(shareholder not limited to appraisal in dissolution).
118. Plaintiffs in the early freeze-out merger cases sued under Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1984), which was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) prohibits the use of fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Id.
Plaintiffs also asserted that the inherent unfairness of going private transactions fell within the
proscriptions of Rule lOb-5.
119. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (complaint by minority
shareholders against majority shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty in short-form merger
redressable under 10(b)), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) (cause of action stated under Rule lOb-5 by minority shareholder who
was forced to sell shares in merger), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
120. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
121. Id. at 473.
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coupled with market conditions supporting going private transactions,
122
encouraged the proliferation of freeze-out mergers. Scholars criticized
this trend, charging that freeze-outs abused shareholders' rights and were
economically inefficient. 123 Some scholars urged Congress to enact a fed-
eral corporate law that would ensure more protection of minority share-
holders' rights than did the state courts and legislatures. 124 With no
legislative response forthcoming at the federal or state level, however, the
state courts were pressured to take some action.
In 1977, the Delaware Supreme Court responded boldly in Singer v.
Magnavox Corp.,125 holding that mere compliance with the merger stat-
ute would no longer validate a freeze-out merger. The Delaware
Supreme Court required the majority shareholders to satisfy their fiduci-
ary duty to the minority shareholders 26 by establishing a business pur-
pose for the freeze-out. 127 Moreover, the court required the majority
shareholders to bear the burden of proving that the freeze-out was en-
tirely fair to the minority shareholders.128
Singer was significant because the Delaware Supreme Court af-
forded minority shareholders some protection by imposing affirmative
122. In the mid 1970's, stock prices dropped, making it attractive for insiders to cause the
corporation to repurchase the public's shares at depressed values.
123. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 114, at 988-89 (it is "particularly invidious" to use pub-
lic-contributed equity to repurchase public shares); Brudney, A Note On "Going Private," 61
VA. L. REv. 1019, 1028 (1975) (contrived merger that affects solely internal rearrangements
defeats any prospect of efficiency gains); Sommer, "Going Private" A Lesson in Corporate
Responsibility, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010 (Nov. 20,
1974); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 906 (1975) (going private enriches insiders at
investing public's expense).
124. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 700-03 (1974) (remedy for "Delaware syndrome" requires federal standards of corpo-
rate responsiblity); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31
Bus. LAW. 991, 1021 (1976) (further federalizing of corporate law only alternative to states'
failure to control management); Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 884 (1976) (a national corporation act would afford greater
recognition of fiduciary responsibility and protection of minority shareholders); Schwartz,
Regulating-Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972)
(outlining basis for federal incorporation legislation); Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federal-
ism and the Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 146, 150 (current
state-oriented system regulating national corporations is backward). But see Arsht, Reply to
Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113, 1114-18 (1976) (Delaware corporation law provides an
effective and inexpensive means of redress for any aggrieved stockholder); Manning, Thinking
Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 3, 15-
19 (Model Corporation Act would stunt the healthy evolution of state corporation laws).
125. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
126. Id. at 980.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 976 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d
107, 109 (1952)).
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duties on management. 129 The progress in Singer was quickly eroded,
however, by a subsequent decision undercutting the business purpose re-
quirement. In Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,130 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the business purpose requirement
was satisfied even if the business purpose served only the interests of the
majority shareholders. 3 1 Nevertheless, the Delaware courts adhered to
Singer's fairness requirement and held that it could be satisfied by a fair
vote of a majority of the minority shareholders because management
would no longer be dealing only with itself.132 Thus, despite the dilution
of the business purpose prong of the Singer requirements, the fairness
prong afforded minority shareholders some protection.
The Weinberger Standard: Fairness
After six years of the Singer principles and more than twenty years
of experience with freeze-out mergers, the Delaware Supreme Court, in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,133 articulated a new standard for freeze-out
mergers. Reversing in part its position in Singer, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that freeze-out mergers need not have a valid business pur-
pose.' 34 Instead, under Weinberger, if freeze-out mergers involve a con-
flict of interest, 35 defendants must establish "their utmost good faith and
129. In Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the fiduciary requirements of Singer, which involved a long-form squeeze-out
merger, were equally applicable to short-form squeeze-out mergers. Id. at 1036. Compare
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983) (long-form merger provision) with id. § 253 (short-form
parent subsidiary merger provision).
130. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
131. Id. at 1123. The court held that the benefit of facilitated long-term debt financing
that would accrue to the parent as a result of the merger was a bona fide business purpose. Id.
at 1125; see also Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (majority
shareholders were reluctant to guarantee corporation's debt incurred to finance expansion;
merger to facilitate financing constituted a proper business purpose); Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d
1089, 1101 (Del. 1983) (elimination of minority shareholders in order to provide assurance
that corporation could honor financial commitments was proper business purpose); Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. 1978) (tax savings achievable by other means and elimi-
nation of tenuous potential conflicts of interest not a valid business purpose for merger).
132. See, e.g., Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 495 (Del. 1982) (allegation
by plaintiff that majority vote of minority shareholders was coerced states a cause of action);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1346 (Del. 1981) (where merger requires approval of
majority of minority shareholders, majority has burden to prove fairness), rev'd and remanded,
457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (corporate action approved by majority of minority sharehold-
ers shifts burden to minority to show unfairness).
133. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
134. Id. at 715.
135. The court said, "[t]he result here could have been entirely different if UOP had ap-
pointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at
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the most scrupulous inherent fairness" of the transaction. 136 The court
focused on two aspects of fairness: fair dealing 137 and a fair price for the
minority shareholders. 138
In Weinberger, the lower court had held that the freeze-out was fair
because it had been approved by a majority of the minority sharehold-
ers. 139 The Delaware Supreme Court disputed this conclusion because it
found deficiencies in the manner in which the majority, Signal Corpora-
tion, conducted the freeze-out. The most flagrant violation was the fail-
ure of two interested directors to disclose fully all relevant facts to the
other directors, the officers, and the minority shareholders." 40 The court
held that "[u]nder the circumstances, an approval by a majority of the
minority [shareholders] was meaningless."' 141 In addition, the court
viewed skeptically the hurried timeframe in which the transaction
evolved, 142 as well as the virtual lack of negotiations between the man-
agements of the parent and subsidiary.' 43
The court in Weinberger placed the burden of proving fraud or un-
fairness on the plaintiffs if the freeze-out was approved by an informed
vote of the minority shareholders. 144 If the plaintiffs could demonstrate
specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct indicating
unfairness, the burden then shifted to the defendants to show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the entire freeze-out transaction was
fair.145 The net result was that if minority shareholders had the burden
of proof and could not allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct, then their sole remedy was through the statutory ap-
praisal process as modified by Weinberger.'46
arm's length." Id. at 709 n.7. The court found, however, that Signal had done nothing to
attempt to structure the transaction on an arm's length basis. Id. at 710.
136. Id.
137. Fair dealing, the Court explained, "embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained." Id. at 711.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 715.
140. A feasibility study by two interlocking directors indicated that the purchase of the
minority interest at $21-24 per share would have been a good investment by the parent. The
study was not disclosed to the other directors, to the officers, or to the minority shareholders of
the subsidiary, and the merger price per share was $21. Id. at 708.
141. Id. at 712.
142. Id. at 711.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 703.
145. Id. After Weinberger, the burden of proof in a freeze-out is the same as in any other
conflict of interest transaction under the Delaware statute.
146. Prior to Weinberger, Delaware courts employed the "Delaware block" or "weighted
average" method to appraise the value of minority shareholders' stock. See, e.g., Heller v.
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Thus, Weinberger facilitated the process of ensuring that a freeze-
out will not be challenged. All management has to do is meet the Wein-
berger requirements of fair dealing and fair price. The criteria for fair
dealing, and thus for deflecting a challenge to a freeze-out, include a fair-
ness opinion from an investment banker; approval by informed, in-
dependent directors of the corporation; and ratification, based on all
material facts, by the corporation's unaffiliated shareholders. 147 Once
Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 596, 98 A.2d 774, 777 (1953); In re General Realty &
Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 497, 52 A.2d 6, 14 (1947). Courts most frequently considered
market value of the shares, net asset value of the corporation, and the earnings value. For a
discussion of the factors and the considerations in assigning values to them, see Comment,
Valuation of the Dissenters'Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1456-71
(1966); see also Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 723-24, 387 N.E.2d
1145, 1148-50 (1979) (discussing "Delaware block" approach valuation).
In Weinberger, the court, cautioning that the fairness test was not "bifurcated ... be-
tween fair dealing and fair price," nevertheless emphasized that if fraud is a factor, "price may
be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger." Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 712. Thus, valuation is a critical issue. Rejecting the prior method of valuation, the
court held that the appropriate method of valuation required consideration of all relevant fac-
tors affecting price. Id. at 713- 14; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975 & Supp. 1982); see
also Note, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 661, 668-70 (1983) (discussing
change in appraisal method).
Weinberger thus offers management two alternatives to avoid a challenge to a freeze-out
merger. First, management need not obtain a fair vote of the minority shareholders if it can
prove the fairness of the transaction. Alternatively, management can obtain a fair vote of the
shareholders. If a fair vote is taken, the minority shareholders have the onerous burden of
showing that the freeze-out was illegal by proving specific acts of fraud and unfairness; if they
cannot prove fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, their sole remedy is through the
statutory appraisal process.
147. Contra Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, Legal Times,
Oct. 10, 1983, at 15, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Longstreth, Fairness]. Former SEC Commis-
sioner Longstreth has denounced the ability of each of these three devices to ensure inherent
fairness for minority shareholders. He has contended that an investment banker's fairness
opinion is deficient because the range of fairness considerations is too broad from which to
extract a meaningful opinion, and because the investment banker is seldom able to consider all
relevant facts. Id. at 19-20. He also has argued that there may be economic pressures on the
banker to support management's position. Id. at 20; see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
A.2d 1333, 1338-39 (Del. Ch. 1981) (finding circumstances surrounding appraisal for fairness
questionable), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 391 (Del. Ch. 1979) (on remand) (questioning
independence of appraiser).
Commissioner Longstreth further has argued that the independent directors' approval is
defective because they invariably have some business or personal connection with the corpora-
tion's management. Longstreth, Fairness, supra, at 20, col. 1. Furthermore, he has contended
that the business judgment rule and the fairness concept are too broadly construed to ensure
any substantive protection for the minority shareholders. Id.
Finally, Commissioner Longstreth believes that ratification by unaffiliated shareholders
does not protect those shareholders because they are not in a position to evaluate the terms of
the transaction and they have no viable option if they reject the deal. Id. at col. 2; see also
Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is
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these requirements are met, the minority shareholders' challenge to a fair
price will be addressed in the appraisal proceedings.
While Singer was significant for its recognition of the conflict of in-
terest problem, the significance of the Weinberger decision is the implica-
tion that a fairness standard can best address management's conflicts of
interest inherent in a freeze-out. The court in Weinberger suggested that
management may employ one of two alternatives to establish fairness.
On the one hand, management may put the transaction to the sharehold-
ers for a vote. If management chooses this route and the stockholders
approve the transaction, the minority shareholders who challenge the
freeze-out will then have the onerous burden of proving fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other unfairness. On the other hand, management may
forego a shareholder vote, but then must prove the fairness of the freeze-
out.
Given the difficulty of proving the fairness of a freeze-out, manage-
ment is unlikely to opt for this burden and therefore will submit the
transaction to a vote of the shareholders. The court encouraged manage-
ment to give the shareholders who have no conflict the opportunity to
vote on the transaction,1 48 an alternative that has many advantages.
First, a vote of the disinterested shareholders eliminates the necessity for
judicial evaluation of whether management's conflict of interest tainted
its decision. Any management self-dealing is effectively eliminated when
the minority shareholders have the power to abort the transaction. Sec-
ond, a fair vote of shareholders is an objective criterion that replaces
judicial evaluation of management's motives. Third, objectivity allows
management to know what is required of them and how to avoid litiga-
tion. Finally, because voting enables the disinterested shareholders to
thwart the transaction, better policing of management's self-dealing is
possible. If management chooses to obtain the approval of the share-
holders who will be frozen out, it is in management's interest to make the
deal sufficiently attractive in order to obtain the required approval. 149
"Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1475 (1981) (argu-
ing that shareholder vote cannot ensure fairness).
Thus, Commissioner Longstreth has contended that use of these three devices "will typi-
cally assure that management's self-dealing is measured, for all practical purposes, not by the
rule of inherent fairness, but by the remarkably elastic rule of business judgment." Longstreth,
Fairness, supra, at 20, col. 2.
148. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
149. Three principal arguments against the utility of shareholder approval exist. First,
shareholders often just follow management's recommendations. Second, shareholders may ac-
cept management's proposal simply because there is no one representing the shareholders to
negotiate for a higher price. Third, a shareholder vote is not dispositive of fairness and may
deprive the minority of the fiduciary protections to which it is entitled under Singer. Weiss,
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In summary, the evolution of the law of freeze-out mergers reveals
the lesson the courts have learned about policing self-dealing transac-
tions: approval by disinterested shareholders can resolve issues presented
by management's inherent conflict of interest. This Commentary now
applies this lesson in the tender offer context.
Parallels to the Defensive Tactics Issue
The conflict of interest in management's tender offer defensive tac-
tics is similar to management's conflict of interest in freeze-out mergers.
Both transactions allow management to favor itself over the sharehold-
ers. Moreover, both transactions enable management to dictate the in-
vestment decisions of the corporation's shareholders. In a freeze-out, for
example, management decides when and at what price the minority will
sell. Similarly, in a hostile tender offer, management's defensive tactics
can preclude shareholders from selling their stock at the offered
premium.
The current law governing defensive tactics is similar to the law of
freeze-out mergers in the mid 1970's. Like the freeze-out mergers then,
the defensive-tactic transactions now are treated by the state courts as
ordinary business transactions, regulated only by traditional statutory
and common law. Moreover, the current state court decisions on defen-
sive tactics reflect the rigidity that once characterized the state court de-
cisions on freeze-out mergers when the courts lacked a feasible
alternative; in the old freeze-out cases, as well as in the current defensive
tactics cases, the courts attempted to treat the transactions according to
the statutory and common law norm. Eventually, courts recognized that
freeze-outs are not ordinary mergers because they involve management
in an inherent conflict of interest. Recognition of the management con-
flict of interest is now similarly due for defensive tactics. In the section
that follows, a legislative solution, similar to the Weinberger scheme, is
proposed for the conflicts wrought by defensive tactics.
A Legislative Proposal
Part II demonstrated the deficiencies of the current judicial evalua-
tion of tender offer defensive tactics. Application of the business judg-
ment rule in this context is of little utility and, in fact, has permitted
corporate managers to adopt defensive tactics without adequately scruti-
nizing their benefit to the target shareholders. The courts, if left to their
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 676-77
(1981); see also supra note 147.
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own devices, might discard the business judgment rule in favor of a stan-
dard that addresses more directly the conflict of interest inherent in de-
fensive tactics. Courts have given no indication, however, that they will
move toward such an approach. Furthermore, such policy decisions are
more appropriately left to the legislatures. A legislative alternative,
therefore, is the most desirable resolution to this problem.
A Proposed Amendment to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)
It is proposed that the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),
be amended to provide the following:
(a) The board of directors of any corporation that desires to take any
action (as defined in part (c)) to make its corporation less attractive
as an actual or potential target of a tender offer shall:
(1) adopt a resolution approving such action;
(2) prepare a disclosure statement outlining the terms and condi-
tions of the proposed action, the method of carrying the same
into effect, the effect on the corporation and its shareholders
from carrying the same into effect, and any other material in-
formation regarding the proposed action;
(3) submit such disclosure to the shareholders with notice for the
meeting required pursuant to (a)(4); and
(4) submit such proposed action to a vote of the shareholders at an
annual or special meeting called for the purpose of voting on
the proposed action.
(b) No such action shall be taken until it has been approved by -
percentage of the outstanding shares of the corporation, consid-
ered as a single class, entitled to vote generally in the election of
directors. Notice for the meeting shall be the same as for any
other annual or special meeting.
(c) For these purposes, "action" requiring compliance with subsec-
tions (a) and (b) shall include any change to the business or finan-
cial or capital structure of the corporation designed to render the
corporation less attractive as an actual or potential target of a
tender offer. "Action" shall not include payments made to or for
consultation with any legal, investment, accounting or other advi-
sor about a contemplated action or any actual or potential tender
offer.
Conceptual Underpinnings of the Proposal
This proposal involves three key features: (1) the absence of any
evaluation of the inherent worth of either tender offers or defensive tac-
tics; (2) the notion that the necessary method for dealing with defensive
tactics should lie with the shareholders; and (3) the use of state, rather
than federal, law to implement the shareholder action.
The proposal presumes no evaluation of tender offers and defensive
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tactics as beneficial or detrimental business transactions.1 50 Rather than
challenging the current environment, in which tender offers are accepted
business transactions that operate primarily within the confines of the
Williams Act, 15' the proposal attempts to regulate the inherent conflict
of interest that management faces when confronted by a hostile tender
offer.
Second, the proposal is premised on the assumption that with
proper disclosure of all relevant information, shareholders can make
competent decisions regarding corporate matters affecting their inter-
ests.1-52 The lesson learned from the judicial treatment of freeze-out
mergers is that an acceptable method of deflecting management's conflict
of interest in areas affecting shareholders is to put the proposed transac-
tion to a vote of the shareholders. The logic is even more compelling in
the hostile tender offer context because defensive tactics can preclude,
rather than merely dictate the terms of, the shareholders' sale of their
stock.
Additionally, shareholder action can be meaningful only if manage-
ment adequately discloses the impact of its proposed defensive tactics.
Because the business judgment rule inadequately monitors defensive tac-
tics, management has long been able to make decisions regarding defen-
sive tactics without contemporaneous shareholder knowledge and
review. By introducing a disclosure element into the decision-making
process, the proposal forces management to evaluate carefully its conflict
of interest before proceeding with a particular defensive tactic. 53
150. Others, including Congress, have made this evaluation and generally have concluded
that, at a minimum, tender offers can be beneficial to corporations, target shareholders, and the
economy. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 n.9 (1982) (Congress did not want to
deny shareholders opportunity of selling shares at premium in tender offer) (quoting 113
CONG. REC. 24666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
151. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)) (amending Securites Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 894 (1934)). Tender offers also operate within the confines of the Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1397 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12
(1982)), and various state tender offer statutes. The constitutionality of many state statutes,
however, are in doubt after the Supreme Court's opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982). In MITE, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, 137.51 (1979). See infra note 163.
152. Some argue that shareholders do not take their franchise seriously. See supra note
149. Such arguments serve as predicates for judicial and legislative interference in sharehold-
ers' investment decisions under the guise of investor protection. Investors, however, when
armed with full and fair disclosure by management, are the best protectors of their own inter-
ests. See also M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 37-63 (1976); Lowen-
stein, supra note 94, at 257-68 (discussing role of shareholder in tender offers).
153. Part of Congress' motive for enacting the disclosure provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws was to help police self-dealing transactions. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Secur-
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Furthermore, the proposal permits all shareholders, rather than just
the disinterested shareholders, to vote. Members of management who
own stock are not treated any differently from other target shareholders
should the defensive tactic be approved or denied. The tender offer solu-
tion is thus distinct from the freeze-out transactions in which manage-
ment and nonmanagement shareholders are treated dissimilarly, and is
analogous to the procedure for organic changes, in which all sharehold-
ers of a class are treated identically and are permitted to vote.
Third, the proposal looks to state, rather than federal, law to imple-.
ment the shareholder review process. Although the regulation of tender
offers is a federal matter, the issue in defensive tactics, namely manage-
ment's conflict of interest, involves fiduciary law, a matter traditionally
relegated to the states. Furthermore, defensive tactics frequently involve
matters of corporate governance, another area of state regulation. Conse-
quently, the state corporate statutes are the most appropriate vehicle to
address this problem.
In addition to the conceptual features, the proposal contains several
practical elements. First, to encompass all of management's defensive
tactics, the proposal employs a purposefully broad definition of manage-
ment action. Second, the proposal permits each state to set the percent-
age of shares required for approval, just as each state currently fixes the
percentage needed for organic changes. Third, the proposal deliberately
leaves management free to obtain professional advice regarding tender
offers or defensive tactics without first gaining shareholder approval. Be-
cause current federal law require target management to take a position
regarding a tender offer, expenditures for professional advice are war-
ranted without shareholder approval. 154 Finally, the proposal regulates
both pre-offer and post-offer defensive tactics.
Critique of the Proposal
One problem implicit in the proposal is that target management's
solicitation of shareholder approval for a proposed defensive tactic re-
quires time. Although management theoretically could procure share-
holder approval within the tender offer's current statutory minimum
timeframe of twenty business days, 155 a lengthening of the minimum
ities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (discussing unscrupulous transactions that gave rise to
securities laws); James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. Rlv. 624, 624-30 (1934) (dis-
cussing political environment prior to enactment of 1933 Act).
154. Moreover, management will have to seek outside expert advice to determine what, if
any, proposal for defensive action they should place before the shareholders for a vote.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1983). For example, Bendix Corporation was able to
schedule a meeting of its stockholders only twenty-one days after Martin Marietta Corporation
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timeframe under federal law may be necessary to implement this
proposal.
What is an appropriate and realistic timeframe remains unclear.
Various proposals have surfaced recently, recommending periods ranging
from forty-four days156 to six months. 157 The SEC is studying this ques-
tion 158 and, along with Congress, is best equipped to decide the appropri-
ate timeframe.
A second consideration is whether the states would adopt such a
proposal. Although Congress desired to favor neither the bidder nor tar-
get management, 159 the states historically have struck a balance in favor
of target management and its efforts to resist takeovers. I60 Thus, the
states may be unwilling to regulate management's defensive tactics.
The states' disinclination to enact the proposed regulation can be
addressed on two grounds. First, the subject of defensive tactics is topi-
cal, and the current pressure on Congress to respond, at least to the most
flagrant defensive tactics, is substantial.16' If these tactics continue un-
began its offer. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 322. Bendix was able to hold its meeting so
quickly in part because the SEC processed the proxy material quickly, and the New York
Stock Exchange waived compliance with its thirty day notice requirement. Id. Thus, it is not
safe to assume that such meetings can occur with the same rapidity with which the Bendix
meeting occurred.
156. The Tender Offer Advisory Committee recommended the timeframe be extended to
forty-four days if the tender offer is for less than all the outstanding stock. The SEC rejected
this proposal in part because it felt the recommendation reflected concerns about two-tiered
bids that should be addressed directly. See SEC Studies Two-Tier Pricing in Tender Offers,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1078 (June 27, 1984).
157. Lowenstein, supra note 94, at 317.
158. The Securities Exchange Commission has consistently rejected lengthy minimum of-
fering periods. Recently the SEC rejected a proposal for a 30 day period saying that share-
holders did not need that long a waiting period in which to make a decision. The SEC
maintains that the timeframe should be established by rule to provide flexibility with rapid
technological changes. See SEC Voices Concern About Tender Offer Reform Act, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) No. 1090 (Jan. 1985).
159. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (Congress enacted Williams Act
to protect investors but sought to avoid favoring either target management or bidder); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (Congress, in enacting Williams Act, was com-
mitted to neutrality in contests for control).
160. For example, several states gave management the advantage by requiring time delays
or time consuming hearings. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-460 (West Supp. 1984)
(allowing management to request a hearing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page
Supp. 1980) (required 20 day precommencement waiting period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 74(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980) (20 day period between offer and purchase of securities required);
see also Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and
Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 694 (1981) (state regulations tilt balance sought in Williams
Act toward incumbent management).
161. For example, Congress held hearings in response to the Bendix-Martin Marietta take-
over. Moreover, the SEC established a Tender Offer Advisory Committee, which recently sent
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checked by state law, Congress is likely to act and thereby to encroach
upon the traditionally state-regulated area of corporate governance.
State legislatures seeking to avoid such federal encroachment must act
first. Second, the proposal is tailored to allow each state to choose the
degree to which it will regulate defensive tactics. Although the mecha-
nism for regulation in each state would be identical--disclosure and a
shareholder vote prior to adoption of any defensive tactic--each state
will set the required percentage for approval. Management in State A
needing only a 51% vote to approve its proposed tactics would be signifi-
cantly less constrained than management in State B needing an 80%
vote. The ability to tailor the proposal to accommodate the state's evalu-
ation of the defensive tactics problem should make the proposal more
palatable.
Finally, the proposal must overcome potential constitutional
problems. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,162 a majority of the United States
Supreme Court held that the Illinois Business Takeover Act violated the
Commerce Clause. 163 A plurality of the Court also held that the Wl-
liams Act pre-empted the state statute. 164 Thus, all state statutes that
affect tender offers must be reviewed for compliance with MITE.
The legislation proposed in this Commentary is distinguishable from
the legislation invalidated in MITE. The aspect of the Illinois Act that
the Court in MITE found violative of the Commerce Clause was the
Act's broad regulation of securities transactions on a nationwide level. 165
proposed legislation to Congress recommending, among other things: 1) the prohibition of an
issuer from repurchasing its own stock during a tender offer; 2) the requirement of majority
approval before a company can issue new securities or more than 5% of a class of securities
already outstanding; 3) the prohibition of an issuer from purchasing its securities from a per-
son who holds a specified percentage for less than two years; and 4) the closing of the 10 day
window period for Schedule 13D filings. See SEC To Send Congress Tender Offer Reform
Legislation, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) No. 1072 (May 16,1984); see also H.R. 5693, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 0984); supra note 88.
162. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see MITE, 457 U.S. at 646. The majority opinion con-
cluded that the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the Illinois Act were excessive in
light of the local interests sought to be served. Id. Although Illinois argued that the statute
was designed to protect resident shareholders, the Court found the statute affected more than
just the Illinois shareholders by preventing nonresident shareholders from tendering their
stock. Id. at 643.
164. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634. Because the majority disposed of the case on commerce
clause grounds, it did not reach the pre-emption issue. Three justices, however, concluded that
the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act because its pro-target management provi-
sions interfered with the federal statute's express policy of "neutrality" and "evenhandedness."
Id. at 633; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (discussing con-
gressional intent in enacting Williams Act to be neutrality and evenhandedness).
165. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
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The Illinois Act was a regulatory roadblock preventing shareholders
from tendering their stock. The legislation proposed here, however,
neither regulates securities transactions on a nationwide level nor pre-
vents shareholders from tendering any shares. To the contrary, the pro-
posed legislation removes target management's ability to prevent the
shareholders from tendering their stock unless the shareholders approve
management's proposed defensive tactic. Moreover, the proposed legis-
lation mirrors the Court's conclusion that tender offers are merely stock
transfers and, as such, should not be hindered. 166 Because the proposed
legislation does not impose any burdens on interstate commerce, it does
not violate the Commerce Clause.
Arguably, the more difficult question about the proposal's constitu-
tionality is whether the Williams Act pre-empts it.167 Although the
Court previously has applied a variety of pre-emption tests,' 68 the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the proposal presents an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the federal statute's full purpose and objective.169
In MITE, a plurality of the Court held that the major purpose of the
Williams Act is to protect target shareholders.170 The plurality reasoned
that this protection occurs not only by providing target shareholders
with adequate information about the takeover, 17' but also by avoiding
statutory favoritism of either management or the takeover bidder. 172 The
plurality found that three aspects of the Illinois Act-the pre-commence-
166. See supra note 163.
167. The pre-emption doctrine is based on the Constitution's supremacy clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides that state laws and regulations are subordinate to federal
laws and regulations. Thus, when state and federal laws conflict, the Constitution dictates that
the federal law pre-empt the state law. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed.
1983).
168. The Court has held that Congress' intent to pre-empt a given state law can be inferred
by one of five tests. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (discussing variety of
expressions used to describe pre-emption); see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (discussing various ways pre-emption may be inferred); Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501 (1956) (different criteria have furnished touchstones for
determination of pre-emption); Rich v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(congressional intent may be evidenced in several ways); McCauliff, Federalism and the Consti-
tutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REV. 295, 300 (1981) (discussing various tests
for determining pre-emption); Casenote, The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017, 1030 (1983) (pre-emption doctrine applies in at least
three contexts).
169. This was the test used by the plurality of the Court to find pre-emption of the state
law in MITE, 457 U.S. at 631-32.
170. Id. at 631-33.
171. Id. at 634.
172. Id. at 633.
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ment notification requirement, 173 the hearing provisions,174 and the pro-
visions allowing the Secretary of State to rule on the substantive fairness
of the tender offer 175-tipped the balance against the bidder and thus
obstructed the Williams Act's objective of protecting target
shareholders. 176
The Illinois Act required the tender offeror to notify both the target
company and the Secretary of State twenty days before the offer became
effective. 177 The plurality found that the additional time provided under
the state Act afforded incumbent management an opportunity to defeat
the tender offer, perhaps to the detriment of the investors. 178 Accord-
ingly, the plurality found that the pre-commencement notice provision
frustrated the objective of the Williams Act. 179
Furthermore, under the Illinois Act, the Secretary of State could
call a hearing at any time prior to the commencement of the offer, with-
out any deadline for completing the hearing.180 Moreover, the statute
required the Secretary to call a hearing upon the request of investors in
Illinois owning at least 10% of the outstanding shares.181 Because in-
cumbent management frequently controls 10% of a corporation's out-
standing shares, this provision allowed target management to combat a
tender offer by delaying the commencement of the offer.182 The potential
for delay favored target management at the expense of the target share-
holders and upset the balance between management and bidder. In en-
acting the Williams Act, however, Congress sought to prevent delay
tactics, recognizing that delay could seriously impede a tender offer.' 83
Because the Illinois Act afforded management an advantage in resisting
173. The Illinois Act required notice to the target 20 days before the commencement of
the tender offer. Id. at 634-35 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1 137.54.B, 137.54.E
(1979))
174. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1 137.57.A-.B (1979)).
175. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, % 137.57.A (1979)).
176. Congress recognized that delay was a serious impediment to a tender offer and thus
could be detrimental to investors' interests. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 637-38; Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 433 U.S. 173 (1979); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 4
(1967).
177. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 11 137.54.E, 137.54.B
(1979)).
178. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
179. Id.
180. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.57.A-.B (1979)).
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tender offers, the Act conflicted with the Williams Act objective of pro-
tecting shareholders. 1 84
Finally, the plurality found that the Williams Act pre-empted the
Illinois Act to the extent that the latter statute allowed the Secretary of
State to rule on the substantive fairness of the tender offer. 185 Although
Congress intended the Williams Act to protect investors, 186 the state's
approach offered investor protection only at the expense of investor au-
tonomy. 187 Thus, the Williams Act pre-empted the Illinois Act because
the state statute conflicted with the approach Congress had adopted.
Following the reasoning of MITE, one argument against the consti-
tutionality of the proposed legislation is that its requirement of share-
holder approval disadvantages target management, thereby interfering
with the Williams Act's goal of neutrality; hence, the proposed legisla-
tion is pre-empted. This argument can be refuted, however, by distin-
guishing the Williams Act goal of neutrality from its actual purpose,
namely, the protection of target shareholders. The Court endorsed this
view in Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc. ,'188 stating that the "policy of
evenhandedness does not go . . .to the purpose of the [Williams Act].
Neutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed toward
a different purpose-the protection of investors."' 8 9 Thus, any legisla-
tion that interferes with neutrality, but does not interfere with the protec-
tion of shareholders, presents no obstacle to the Williams Act and thus is
not pre-empted by the federal law.
Moreover, the proposed legislation avoids the pre-emption problems
of MITE. First, unlike the Illinois Act, which allowed target manage-
ment to use delay to resist a tender offer, 190 the proposal provides no
weapon for either bidders or target managements; the proposal gives only
target shareholders the ability to abort defensive tactics. Second, the
proposal offers shareholder protection without sacrificing shareholder
autonomy. By allowing target management to resist tender offers only
upon shareholder authorization, the proposed legislation is consistent
184. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
185. Id. Under the Illinois Act, the Secretary was required to deny registration of the
tender offer if he found it inequitable. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.57.E
(1979)).
186. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)).
187. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
188. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
189. Id. at 29.
190. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637.
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with the intent underlying the Williams Act to allow shareholders the
freedom to make their own decisions in a tender offer.
Conclusion
The proliferation of tender offers as an accepted way of expanding
businesses has resulted in a comparable proliferation of defensive tactics
used by target management seeking to retain corporate independence.
Lacking legislative guidance or traditional judicial tests appropriate for
evaluating conflicts of interest, state courts currently approach these de-
fensive tactics with a rigidity reminiscent of the early freeze-out cases. If
the fiduciary concept is to have any meaning and effect, courts cannot
evaluate defensive tactics under rules and statutory provisions designed
for transactions in which management is not engaged in self-dealing.
The current gap in this area of the law parallels in many respects the
inchoate state of the law of freeze-out mergers in the 1970's. Left to its
own devices, the Delaware Supreme Court created the Weinberger stan-
dards for freeze-out mergers. The Weinberger method implies that man-
agement can remove the taint of a conflict of interest by obtaining a fair
vote from a majority of the minority shareholders. The Delaware
Supreme Court, and other courts, similarly may resolve the problem of
defensive tactics. The courts' task could be eased considerably, the result
would be clearer, and the process would be better if the regulation came
from the state legislatures rather than the state courts. This Commentary
proposes that the state legislatures enact an amendment to the Model
Business Corporation Act that would establish a method similar to that
in Weinberger for approval of target management defensive tactics.
The proposed legislation, which requires shareholder approval for
any defensive tactic, is an attempt to accommodate many competing in-
terests. Foremost are the conflicting interests of management and share-
holders who are the targets of an actual or a potential tender offer. The
decision whether or not to sell in response to a tender offer is a right of
the shareholder as an investor and should not be abridged absent some
consensual process. Because of the inherent conflict of interest, the deci-
sion to defend against a tender offer should not rest solely with manage-
ment. Management, however, by state statute is delegated much of the
initiative in areas of corporate governance, the arena in which most de-
fensive tactics occur. Although a prior ban on management's entry into
this area may be a solution, it is not the most desirable because its overin-
clusiveness would ban certain nontainted corporate actions. The best ap-
proach, therefore, is to allow defensive tactics only upon shareholder
approval.
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